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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE NOT DEFENDING THE
DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: POLITICALLY
SIGNIFICANT, LEGALLY IRRELEVANT?
INTRODUCTION
On February 23, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder sent a letter
to Speaker of the House John Boehner informing him that the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) would no longer defend the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA).1 The letter insisted that DOMA is unconsti-
tutional2 and marked a great political success for supporters of same-
sex marriage. In the realm of immigration law, the political move by
the DOJ was a huge step forward for nonresidents in same-sex rela-
tionships with American citizens. Currently, however, the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), bound by judi-
cial precedent, maintains that marital visas for same-sex marriages
may not be granted. 3 Further, this precedent is strengthened because
DOMA does not recognize same-sex marriages issued under state
law.4 Precedent has created significant hurdles for same-sex couples
for decades and DOMA has only added to those hurdles, sparking
much debate and controversy. This Comment focuses specifically on
the impact the DOJ's decision has had on deportation proceedings in
immigration courts and how immigration law needs to be changed to
combat the struggles that lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgendered
(LGBT) nonimmigrants face in the United States.
In May of 2011, an immigration judge suspended a deportation case
against a nonresident, Henry Velandia, stating that the DOJ and the
1. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, to John A. Boehner,
Speaker of the House, U.S. Cong. (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Holder Letter]. The letter states
that the DOJ, as instructed by President Obama, will no longer be defending the validity of
DOMA. Id. In the letter, Attorney General Holder argues that DOMA is unconstitutional as
applied to gay men and women who have entered into valid, state-recognized same-sex mar-
riages. Id.
2. Id.
3. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 1982).
4. See Jordana Lynne Mosten, Note, Imagining Immigration Without DOMA, 21 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 383, 384 (2010); see also Matthew S. Pinix, The Unconstitutionality of DOMA + INA:
How Immigration Law Provides a Forum for Attacking DOMA, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J.
455, 459 (2008). Both articles discuss the significance of DOMA in conjunction with current
immigration law by analyzing the hurdles DOMA presents for same-sex couples seeking immi-
gration status for their noncitizen partners.
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courts needed time to determine whether a same-sex marriage would
affect eligibility for residency status.5 Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (ICE) subsequently agreed to close deportation proceed-
ings.6 Mr. Velandia is a gay man and legally married to an American
man under Connecticut law.7 The immigration judge decided to post-
pone Mr. Velandia's deportation proceedings based on the DOJ's new
stance that DOMA is unconstitutional, which caused the judge to
question whether immigration law would recognize a valid same-sex
marriage for residency purposes.8
Advocates of marriage equality for LGBT individuals have her-
alded the DOJ's decision as "a watershed moment in the fight for
LGBT equality." 9 However, this refusal to defend DOMA, and the
subsequent refusal to pursue deportation cases, although politically
and socially significant, has limited and potentially negative legal con-
sequences for nonresidents in same-sex marriages. First and foremost,
refusing to defend DOMA does not actually repeal or invalidate the
act 10 and, as such, immigration law still cannot recognize same-sex
marriages for purposes of granting marital visas.1 This stance does
not further complicate a process in order to create positive change,
but rather creates complications without establishing the necessary le-
gal protections for these individuals. More specifically, this position
places married LGBT noncitizens in a state of limbo because even
though deportation proceedings have been deferred or dismissed,
these individuals are still subject to deportation proceedings in the fu-
ture. Second, the DOJ position has the potential to mislead many in-
dividuals by causing them to believe that their same-sex marriage now
provides them the same residency status as noncitizens in heterosex-
ual marriages. This misguided belief is likely to cause married couples
in the LGBT community to make poor decisions with regard to their
immigration and residency status.
With all of the above in mind, this Comment discusses the historical
treatment of gay and lesbian binational couples under U.S. immigra-
tion law, and the many hurdles that these individuals have faced in
5. Kirk Semple, U.S. Drops Deportation Proceedings Against Immigrant in Same-Sex Mar-




9. HRC Statement on Historic DOJ Brief in Golinski Case, in HRC Blog, HUMAN RIGHTS
CAMPAIGN (July 5, 2011), http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/hrc-statement-on-historic-doj-brief-in-
golinski-case.
10. See E.J. Graff, Is DOMA Dead?, NATION (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/arti
cle/158862/doma-dead.
11. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
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gaining the rights and protections that heterosexual couples have. Al-
though this Comment analyzes the larger problems that DOMA cre-
ates, it will more narrowly argue that the recent refusal to defend
DOMA is nothing more than a politically driven action that has little
legal impact for same-sex couples seeking immigration status through
marriage.
Part II illustrates the historical background of U.S. immigration law
and its treatment of marriage, DOMA, and the struggles LGBT men
and women have faced in gaining rights under immigration law.12
Part II also discusses Attorney General Holder's letter to Speaker
Boehner and will focus on (1) the letter's contents and significance
and (2) the letter's influence on deportation proceedings of individu-
als in same-sex marriages. 13 Part III analyzes the DOJ's position on
DOMA's constitutionality and argues that this refusal to defend is pri-
marily a political move that places noncitizens in same-sex marriages
with citizens in a state of limbo. 14 Part III then demonstrates the lim-
ited, and potentially damaging, legal impact that Attorney General
Holder's letter has on such individuals. 15 Finally, Part IV discusses
the overall impact this situation has had and will have on both immi-
gration law and the struggle for LGBT individuals to gain rights and
protections under federal law.16
II. BACKGROUND
A. Immigration Law and Congress's Power to Exclude and Admit
Through the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Congress has
the power to both admit and exclude noncitizens to and from the
country.17 In terms of exclusion, the Supreme Court has consistently
held that Congress's right to exclude noncitizens is subject to ex-
tremely limited judicial review because it is a plenary power that is
inherent in Congress's authority to govern its territory. 18 Congress
also retains the right to admit individuals into the country, and
12. See infra notes 17-73 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 74-106 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 106-38 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 106-38 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 138-56 and accompanying text.
17. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
18. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889); see also Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). These two cases determined the judiciary's responsibil-
ity in the realm of immigration law and made it clear that Congress essentially had free reign in
the area. In other words, these cases established that the judiciary was not to question an act of
Congress concerning immigration law. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (discussing the
limited responsibility the judiciary has in reviewing immigration laws enacted by Congress).
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through this right it has developed multiple guidelines and complex
requirements for admission to the United States.19 This Part discusses
Congress's historical right to exclude, its development through the
courts, and ways in which this right to exclude has been enforced.
This Part also discusses the basic process through which Congress ad-
mits individuals into the United States and illustrates how marital sta-
tus may be used for admittance.
1. Congressional Right to Exclude Under Plenary Power
A plenary power is defined as "[p]ower that is broadly construed. '20
The Supreme Court clearly stated in Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
and has since consistently held, that Congress's power to exclude
aliens from the United States is a power "which we do not think open
to controversy."' l In Chae Chan Ping, the Court held that if Congress
determined that the presence of aliens would be dangerous to the
country's peace and security, Congress could exclude those individuals
whether or not their presence raised any actual concerns. 22 In
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, the Court again clarified this point,
stating that "every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sov-
ereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of
foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases
and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. '23 Because
Congress's power to exclude aliens is so broad, it can exclude based
on sexual orientation by choosing not to recognize same-sex mar-
riages, and the power to do so is not to be questioned by the courts. 24
Another recent illustration of Congress's exclusionary power was its
decision to pass legislation that denied admittance to HIV-positive in-
dividuals unless they obtained a waiver. 25 A positive test result pro-
vided grounds for denying the individual access into the United States,
19. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a).
20. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1288 (9th ed. 2009).
21. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603. This case dealt with an act of Congress that excluded
Chinese laborers from reentering the country after having left. Id. at 589. The plaintiffs claimed
that the act was unconstitutional. Id. However, the Court disagreed and reasoned that an exclu-
sionary act of Congress could not be questioned in the courts. Id. at 609-11. This illustrates the
larger point that Congress's power in this area is extremely broad, and the Supreme Court has
rendered the judicial system almost completely powerless to ever question an act of Congress
that excludes noncitizens from being admitted into the country.
22. Id. at 606.
23. Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659. While this case dealt with habeas corpus, it further solid-
ified the reasoning in Chae Chan Ping: Congress's power in this realm will only be subjected to
the most limited judicial scrutiny. Id. at 663-64.
24. Id.
25. See Sherryl S. Zounes, Note, Positive Movement: Revisiting the HIV Exclusion to Legal
Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 529 (2008).
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regardless of any specific health threats posed.26 This example dem-
onstrates Congress's power to exclude anyone from the country, re-
gardless of its reasoning and rationale, without judicial review.
2. Attaining Residency Status Through Marriage
More than one-third of noncitizens who gain residency status in the
United States do so by marrying a U.S. citizen or permanent resi-
dent.27 "The general rule is that the validity of a marriage is ordinarily
judged by the law of the place where it is celebrated. '28 This rule,
although not absolute, applies to marriages entered into in foreign
countries or in states or territories of the United States.29 However,
not all marriages, though otherwise valid, are construed as such for
immigration purposes. 30 First, the INA specifically prohibits any mar-
riage in which "the contracting parties thereto are not physically pre-
sent in the presence of each other, unless the marriage shall have been
consummated." 31 Second, marriages for the sole purpose of permit-
ting a noncitizen to gain immigration status will not be recognized.32
Finally, courts have held that marriages that are considered valid in
other places but would violate public policy or U.S. law will not be
valid for immigration purposes. 33
Marriage is one important way that people can gain admission as
legal permanent residents in the United States. However, the deter-
mination of what constitutes a valid marriage under immigration law
is not necessarily clear. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, in Adams v. Howerton, articulated a two-step analysis
to determine whether a marriage is valid for immigration purposes.34
First, the court must determine whether the marriage is valid under
state law.3 5 Second, the court must determine whether that same valid
26. Id. at 532.
27. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 327 (6th ed. 2008); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006) (including spouses in the
definition of "immediate relatives," which allows them to be eligible for residency).
28. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 27, at 327 (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35).
32. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 27, at 327.
33. Id.; see also In re Darwish, 14 I. & N. Dec. 307, 308-09 (1973) (finding that a polygamous
marriage could not be recognized for immigration purposes, although valid under Jordanian law,
because polygamy violates U.S. public policy); In re Zappia, 12 I. & N. Dec. 439, 442 (1967)
(finding that a valid marriage between first cousins in South Carolina was not recognized be-
cause the couple lived in Wisconsin, which did not allow such a marriage).
34. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 1982).
35. Id.
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marriage qualifies under the INA.36 In answering the first question,
the court noted that "the validity of a marriage is governed by the law
of the place of celebration. '37 For the second step of the analysis, the
court ruled that Congress has the right to determine the conditions of
immigration status, and thus the court must look to the intent of Con-
gress to determine whether a marriage qualifies under the INA.38
3. Structure and Authority of Deportation Proceedings
The INA empowered the Attorney General with the authority to
properly execute the immigration laws passed by Congress. 39 Accord-
ingly, the Attorney General has the power to "establish such regula-
tions, prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries and other papers,
issue such instructions, review such administrative determinations in
immigration proceedings, delegate such authority, and perform such
other acts as the Attorney General determines to be necessary" for
carrying out the laws enacted under the INA.40 The INA further de-
clared that an immigration judge has the responsibility for conducting
any proceedings that determine whether or not to deport an alien re-
siding in the United States.41 Any decision to deport or not deport an
alien residing in the Unites States is at the discretion of the immigra-
tion judge overseeing the proceeding. 42
Once a decision has been made by an immigration judge in a depor-
tation proceeding, that decision can be appealed to the Board of Im-
migration Appeals (BIA), which has nationwide jurisdiction over
decisions made by immigration judges.43 The BIA is the final admin-
istrative remedy for reviewing a decision made in an immigration
court.44 Once a BIA decision has been rendered, however, that deci-
sion can be further appealed to the federal courts for judicial review.45
In addition to being appealed to federal courts, decisions made by an
individual immigration judge or the BIA can be overruled indepen-
dently by the Attorney General.46
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1038-39.
38. Id. at 1039 ("[A] valid marriage is determinative only if Congress so intends.").
39. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(1) (2006).
40. Id. § 1103(g)(2).
41. See id. § 1229a(a)(1).
42. See id. § 1229a(c)(1)(A).
43. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST., http://www.justice.gov/eoir/bia
info.htm (last updated Nov. 2011).
44. Id.
45. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
46. See Board of Immigration Appeals, supra note 43.
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With the above background information in mind, the remainder of
this Comment will focus specifically on DOMA's interaction with cur-
rent immigration law and the problems associated with the removal of
aliens that are in valid, state-recognized same-sex marriages. The fol-
lowing parts will outline DOMA, the DOJ's responsibility to defend
federal laws, and the DOJ's recent decision to stop defending DOMA
in federal court.
B. DOMA
DOMA has been an often debated and controversial topic since its
enactment in 1996.47 Because it is a federal statute, DOMA has
greatly impacted many areas of the law at all levels of government.
DOMA states:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative
bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word "marriage"
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as hus-
band and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. 48
Some supporters of DOMA argued that "marriage has been an in-
stitution that represents a union between a man and woman" and
same-sex couples have other legal options, which "should not include
changing the definition of marriage to allow same-sex marriages. '49
DOMA does not prohibit states from granting same-sex marriages;
instead, it asserts that the federal government will refuse to recognize
any same-sex marriage granted by a state.50 It accomplishes this by
unambiguously denying same-sex couples federal benefits that are
provided to couples in heterosexual marriages. 51 Indeed, DOMA pre-
vents same-sex couples from obtaining over 1,000 benefits based on
marital status. 52 Additionally, DOMA mandates that any other fed-
eral statute define "spouse" and "marriage" in the same manner, 53
and offers further guidance for states:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
47. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
48. Defense of Marriage Act, sec. 3, § 7, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419-20 (1996)
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)).
49. See 142 CoNo. REC. S10552 (1996) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan).
50. Mark P. Strasser, "Defending" Marriage in Light of the Moreno-Cleburne-Romer-Law-
rence Jurisprudence: Why DOMA Cannot Pass Muster After Lawrence, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV.
421, 436 (2005).
51. Id. at 437.
52. Id.
53. Pinix, supra note 4, at 459.
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judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.54
When drafting this portion of the law, the intent was clearly to "pre-
vent individuals from marrying their same-sex partners in a state rec-
ognizing such unions and then going back to their domiciles
demanding that their marriages be recognized. ' 55 It is clear from both
the text of the statute and its legislative history that its aim was to
"protect" the traditional notion of marriage at all costs. 56 In sum,
DOMA's refusal to recognize same-sex marriages creates a significant
hurdle to same-sex couples seeking immigration status for their
spouses.
C. LGBT Historical Struggles to Gain Immigration
Rights and Protections
By defining "marriage" as a union between one man and one
woman, DOMA presents the most difficult hurdle to overcome in
granting same-sex couples immigration rights and protections. 57 How-
ever, LGBT struggles in attaining immigration rights dates back long
before DOMA's enactment. In 1982, for example, in Adams v. How-
erton, the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether a male noncitizen qualified
as a "spouse" under the INA for purposes of immigration status after
obtaining a marriage license in Colorado with a male citizen.5 8 The
court first articulated that determining whether or not a marital visa
would be granted was dependent on a two-step analysis: (1) whether
the marriage is valid under state law, and (2) whether that state-recog-
nized marriage is valid under the INA.59 However, the court then
completely ignored the first step of this analysis, and concluded that
the validity of the marriage under Colorado law was irrelevant be-
cause nothing in section 201(b) of the INA indicates that "spouse"
was intended to include a person of the same sex.60 In making its
54. Defense of Marriage Act, sec. 2, § 1738C, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
55. Strasser, supra note 50, at 422 (citing The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on S. 1740
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 2 (1996) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch,
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary)); see also 142 CONG. REC. 16,799 (1996) (statement of Rep.
Steve Largent).
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C; Strasser, supra note 50, at 422.
57. Mosten, supra note 4, at 384.
58. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (9th Cir 1982).
59. Id. at 1038.
60. Id. at 1040.
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ruling, the court relied on a well-known canon of statutory construc-
tion: "[U]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking
their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. '61 The court, rely-
ing on dictionary definitions, stated that "'marriage' ordinarily con-
templates a relationship between a man and a woman. '62 Based on
this definition, the court decided that DOMA could not be construed
to include same-sex partners as "immediate relatives. '63
Long before Adams, in 1952, the INA had express language exclud-
ing "aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or a
mental defect from entering the country. ' 64 At the time this exclusion
was in effect, courts had concluded that this language was also "in-
tended to exclude homosexuals from admission into the country. ' 65
This position was bolstered by a Senate subcommittee that conducted
a study and determined that when Congress chose to use the term
"psychopathic personality," it intended to include "homosexuals and
other sex perverts. ' 66 Consequently, in Boutilier v. INS, the Supreme
Court held that the Senate did not clearly intend to exclude all homo-
sexuals from being admitted to the country, but found that Boutilier's
deportation was based on the fact that his homosexuality occurred
over a continuous and uninterrupted period of time.67 It has been
noted that "[t]he majority of the Court concluded that it was better
for a man to be separated from his family, including his partner of
eight years, than to allow another homosexual to enter the country.' '68
The INA endorsed this type of discrimination until 1990, when Con-
gress finally removed "psychopathic personality" from the act. 69
More recently, LGBT individuals have made some gains in ob-
taining rights and protections under immigration law; however, these
gains have not necessarily been either enacted by Congress or sup-
ported by law. 70 For example, some rights have been expanded to
61. Id. at 1040 (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1384 (1971); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 876 (5th ed. 1979)).
63. Id. at 1038, 1040.
64. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414-477, 66 Stat. 163,182 (1952) (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1952) (repealed)).
65. Christopher A. Duefias, Note, Coming to America: The Immigration Obstacle Facing
Binational Same-Sex Couples, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 817 (2000).
66. Id. at 820 (citing Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 121 (1967)).
67. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967).
68. Duefias, supra note 65, at 820.
69. Id. at 825.
70. Blythe Wygonik, Refocus on the Family: Exploring the Complications in Granting the Fam-
ily Immigration Benefit to Gay and Lesbian United States Citizens, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 493,
501-02 (2005).
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include same-sex couples on a case-by-case basis.71 USCIS adminis-
trators may confer spousal benefits to same-sex couples at their dis-
cretion in special, and usually extreme, circumstances. 72 As a result,
only a small number of people have been able to obtain rights and
protections through this practice. 73 Therefore, it is clear that the
struggle for LGBT individuals in gaining the legal protections and
rights that married, heterosexual couples receive is still ongoing. Ac-
cordingly, the decision by the DOJ to stop defending DOMA in fed-
eral courts, as outlined in the next Part, is one way in which the
federal government is attempting to combat the struggles faced by the
LGBT community.
D. Attorney General Eric Holder's Letter
The letter from the Attorney General to the Speaker of the House
on February 23, 2011, informed Speaker Boehner that President
Obama had determined that DOMA, "as applied to same-sex couples
who are legally married under state law, violates the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment. ' '74 With the above history and
considerations in mind, this Part reviews the DOJ's general responsi-
bilities to defend federal laws and its determination that DOMA is
unconstitutional, resulting in the decision to not defend it in federal
courts.
1. DOJ's Responsibility to Enforce and Defend the Laws of the
United States
Congress, through the Judiciary Act of 1789, created the Office of
the Attorney General, which was originally conceived as a one-person
position that had the responsibility to prosecute all suits in the Su-
preme Court in which the United States government had an interest. 75
Over time, however, the government's interest in litigation increased
far beyond the capacity of a single person. Thus, Congress established
the DOJ with the Attorney General as its head to aid the federal gov-
ernment with its litigation responsibilities. 76 The DOJ is an executive
department, 77 and the Attorney General has the authority to "make
such provisions as he considers appropriate authorizing the perform-
71. Id. at 501.
72. Id. at 501-02.
73. See id. at 502.
74. Holder Letter, supra note 1, at 1.
75. About DOJ, U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST., http://www.justice.gov/about/about.html (last up-
dated Mar. 2012).
76. Id.
77. 28 U.S.C § 501 (2006).
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ance by any other officer, employee, or agency of the Department of
Justice of any function of the Attorney General. '78 Furthermore,
Congress determined that "the conduct of litigation in which the
United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested,
and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Depart-
ment of Justice. '79
Because Congress authorized the DOJ's discretion and control over
suits involving the United States, it follows that the DOJ may decide
not to defend a federal statute that is being challenged in the courts.
Accordingly, the DOJ has taken this position with regard to DOMA,
and the remainder of this Part focuses on that decision.
2. DOJ Concludes that Heightened Scrutiny Is the Appropriate
Standard of Review for Classifications Based on Sexual
Orientation
Attorney General Holder's letter began by stating that the DOJ
had previously defended DOMA in jurisdictions where circuit courts
had held that "classifications based on sexual orientation are subject
to rational basis review." 80 However, the DOJ changed course and
concluded that classifications based on sexual orientation should be
analyzed under heightened scrutiny. 81 The DOJ conceded that while
the Supreme Court has not directly articulated the proper level of
scrutiny for classifications based on sexual orientation,8 2 many Su-
preme Court decisions outline certain factors that courts consider
when determining the appropriate level of scrutiny, including
(1) whether the group in question has suffered a history of discrimi-
nation; (2) whether individuals "exhibit obvious, immutable, or dis-
tinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group"; (3)
whether the group is a minority or is politically powerless; and (4)
whether the characteristics distinguishing the group have little rela-
tion to legitimate policy objectives or to an individual's "ability to
perform or contribute to society."'83
After considering these factors, the DOJ determined that classifica-
tions based on sexual orientation should clearly be reviewed under
heightened scrutiny.84
78. Id. § 510.
79. Id. § 516.
80. Holder Letter, supra note 1, at 1-2.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602-03 (1987); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1985)).
84. Id.
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In reviewing the first factor, the DOJ determined that there is "a
significant history of purposeful discrimination against gay and lesbian
people," noting that "until very recently states have 'demean[ed]
the[ ] existence' of gays and lesbians by 'making their private sexual
conduct a crime."' 8 5 As to the second factor, the DOJ determined
that "while sexual orientation carries no visible badge, a growing sci-
entific consensus accepts that sexual orientation is a characteristic that
is immutable. '86 The DOJ also noted that "it is undoubtedly unfair to
require sexual orientation to be hidden from view to avoid
discrimination."8 7
When reviewing the third issue, the DOJ considered anti-sodomy
laws, Don't Ask, Don't Tell, and the fact that the federal government
grants no protection for employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation.88 Based on this historical evidence, the DOJ concluded
that LGBT individuals have "limited political power and 'ability to
attract the [favorable] attention of the lawmakers."' 8 9 The DOJ fur-
ther argued that evidence showing "that the political process is not
closed entirely to gay and lesbian people was irrelevant." 90 It con-
cluded that absolute exclusion was not the standard used by the Court
when it raised the level of scrutiny for gender-based classifications,
which led to greater political protections for women.91
Finally, the DOJ determined that, in regards to the fourth factor,
"there is a growing acknowledgement that sexual orientation 'bears
no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society."' 92 The DOJ
stated that changes in legislation, community practices and attitudes,
and social sciences "all make clear that sexual orientation is not a
characteristic that generally bears on legitimate policy objectives." 93
After analyzing and discussing all of the above factors, the DOJ
concluded that the appropriate standard of review for classifications
based on sexual orientation is heightened scrutiny. 94 As such, the
DOJ proceeded to apply this heightened standard of review in deter-
85. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)).
86. Holder Letter, supra note 1, at 3 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 101
(1992)).
87. Id. (citing Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515).
88. Id.
89. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
445 (1985)).
90. Id. at 2.
91. Id. at 3.
92. Holder Letter, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686
(1973)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 3-4.
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mining whether DOMA was constitutional under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 95
3. Application of Heightened Scrutiny to DOMA
The DOJ, after finding that heightened scrutiny was the appropriate
standard of review, explained that in order for the United States to
defend DOMA it must do more than advance "hypothetical ratio-
nales" allowable under rational basis review. For instance, in United
States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court utilized heightened scrutiny in
reviewing a discriminatory state action based on gender. 96 The Court
articulated that, under this standard of review, the state must show
that its discriminatory action furthers an important government objec-
tive and that the action is substantially related to that objective. 97
Any justification under this standard must be genuine and cannot be
based on overbroad generalizations. 98
The DOJ, after parsing heightened scrutiny precedent, determined
that it must only defend DOMA "by invoking Congress' actual justifi-
cations for the law."99 The DOJ reviewed the legislative record,
which showed "numerous expressions reflecting moral disapproval of
gays and lesbians and their intimate family relationships. '" 100 Further,
the DOJ noted that these types of overbroad generalizations are "pre-
cisely the kind of stereotype-based thinking and animus the Equal
Protection Clause is designed to guard against."' 01
As a result of the above findings, President Obama instructed the
DOJ to stop defending DOMA in cases pending in the southern dis-
trict of New York and the district of Connecticut. 10 2 However, Attor-
ney General Holder informed Speaker Boehner that the executive
branch would continue to enforce DOMA until either Congress has
repealed it or the Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional. 10 3 This
meant that the DOJ would continue to enforce judicial rulings that
order deportation of individuals who used same-sex marriage as the
qualification for immigration status because of the restrictions created
95. Id. at 4.
96. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
97. Id. at 533.
98. Id. (noting that in this case the state could not rely on any generalizations based upon the
differences between men and women).
99. Holder Letter, supra note 1, at 4.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 4-5 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985); Palmore v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
102. Id. at 5.
103. See id.
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by DOMA. However, it would not otherwise actively defend the va-
lidity of DOMA in the court system. The letter made clear that the
DOJ has previously "declined to defend statutes despite the availabil-
ity of professionally responsible arguments, in part because the De-
partment does not consider every plausible argument to be a
'reasonable' one. 104 Further, the DOJ has previously ceased defend-
ing a statute when a President unilaterally determined that it was un-
constitutional, as is the case here. 105 Therefore, the DOJ instructed its
attorneys to refrain from defending DOMA in the courts because of
its unconstitutionality.' 0 6
III. ANALYSIS
This Part of the Comment argues that Attorney General Holder's
letter, a so-called "landmark document," is nothing more than a politi-
cal action that is potentially progressive, but fails to legally protect
noncitizens in valid same sex-marriages. This legal insignificance can
be seen in two ways. First, the DOJ's position does not give nonci-
tizens in same-sex marriages any certainty as to their residency status.
The main reason for this is that DOMA is only one hurdle that same-
sex couples must overcome to gain legal protections under federal im-
migration law. Second, this political move may lead individuals in this
situation to misread its actual legal impact and cause them to make
misguided decisions affecting their immigration status.
As a result, refusing to defend DOMA in the courts is only granting
noncitizens in same-sex marriages temporary protection, which places
them in a state of limbo with substantial uncertainty regarding their
future immigration status.
A. The DOJ Decision and Its Creation of Complex Uncertainty
1. The House of Representatives Has Elected to Defend DOMA in
Place of the DOJ
Two weeks after receiving Attorney General Holder's letter,
Speaker Boehner announced that he was beginning a process that
would essentially "witness the House of Representatives taking over
the legal responsibilities of arguing for the constitutionality of the De-
104. Id.
105. Holder Letter, supra note 1, at 5 (citing Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 1073, 1083 (2001)).
106. Id. at 6.
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fense of Marriage Act. ' 10 7 Speaker Boehner convened a meeting of
the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) and stated that "[t]he
constitutionality of this law should be determined by the courts-not
by the [P]resident unilaterally-and this action by the House will en-
sure the matter is addressed in a manner consistent with our
Constitution."1 0 8
The BLAG voted to direct the House General Counsel to defend
DOMA if the DOJ was no longer willing to do so.109 To support this
new responsibility, Speaker Boehner insisted that funds needed to be
diverted from the DOJ and given to the House. 10 The letter indicates
a clear intent by Speaker Boehner and House Republicans to defend
DOMA in the court system,' regardless of President Obama's deter-
mination that DOMA is unconstitutional. 112
This clear intent to defend DOMA undercuts the seemingly pro-
gressive and successful aspects of the DOJ's refusal to defend DOMA
because DOMA is still a legally enacted statute; until it is repealed or
held unconstitutional, both Congress and outside groups who petition
the courts to intervene on behalf of the DOJ can defend the law. 113
Further, as previously explained, decisions in immigration courts can
eventually be appealed to the federal courts, as well as the Supreme
Court. 114 Although the DOJ, sole executive agency in charge of litiga-
tion involving the United States, has the authority to choose whether
to defend a federal statute, Congress can step in if it chooses to do so.
Thus, if the DOJ refuses to defend DOMA in deportation proceed-
ings, then the House can step in its place and appeal decisions from
immigration courts to the federal courts. In this way, the House
would defend the constitutionality of DOMA by arguing that immi-
gration courts cannot recognize same-sex marriages for purposes of
noncitizens gaining marital visas.
Thus, the primary concern is what happens to individuals who have
had their deportation proceedings suspended when the House defends
DOMA. For Mr. Velandia, the noncitizen from Venezuela whose de-
107. Sam Stein, Boehner-Led Group Will Defend DOMA in Court, HUFFINGTON POST, http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/04/john-boehner-DOMA-defense n-831548.html (last up-
dated May 25, 2011, 7:35 PM).
108. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Letter from John Boehner, Speaker of the House, U.S. Cong., to Nancy Pelosi, House




112. See Holder Letter, supra note 1, at 1.
113. Graff, supra note 10.
114. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 27, at 292.
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portation was delayed, this question is extremely important. 115 Be-
cause Mr. Velandia is not currently facing deportation, he is fortunate
enough to begin building his life with his spouse, Josh Vandiver, a U.S.
citizen. 116 But assume Mr. Velandia and Mr. Vandiver start their lives
together as a family, and then DOMA is held to be a constitutional act
of Congress. Without an express allowance from Congress, immigra-
tion courts, under DOMA, have no authority to recognize their mar-
riage for purposes of admittance to the United States.11 7
The ultimate concern is that until DOMA is repealed or held un-
constitutional, these noncitizens face an insurmountable obstacle to
beginning their lives as citizens or residents of this country. Deferring
these deportations gives noncitizens in same-sex marriages a distorted
view of reality because it does not guarantee a future in this country.
This will likely foster a perpetual feeling of anxiety because at any
moment these noncitizens could be deported and their new lives
would be taken from them.
2. Immigration Judges Suspending Removal Cases Provides No
Legal Precedent or Authority on DOMA in the Federal
Court System
An immigration judge suspending a deportation proceeding does
not settle the issue of DOMA and its application to aliens in same-sex
marriages. Immigration courts are part of a separate administrative
body with the authority to specifically determine deportation proceed-
ings. As such, any decision in immigration court surrounding DOMA
has no legal weight beyond that proceeding. It provides no precedent
for other courts in the federal system, and as such, the constitutional-
ity of DOMA is still left to be determined by the Supreme Court.
Accordingly, the judicial response to the DOJ's refusal to enforce
DOMA provides further evidence that this position offers no signifi-
cant legal protections to individuals in same-sex marriages." 8 In
Newark, the immigration judge who suspended Mr. Velandia's depor-
tation stated that he "wanted to allow time for the [A]ttorney
[G]eneral and the courts to work out whether, under some circum-
stances, a gay partner might be eligible for residency."'119 Further-
more, the judge in that case placed significant weight on In re
Dorman, which Attorney General Holder, through his authority to
115. See Semple, supra note 5.
116. Id.
117. See Pinix, supra note 4, at 459.
118. See Semple, supra note 5.
119. Id.
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review and overrule any immigration court or BIA decision, vacated
due to the BIA's application of DOMA.120 Again, an immigration
judge articulated the notion that the issue of DOMA and federal rec-
ognition of same-sex marriages in general is something that the courts
need to figure out.121 Experts stated that the decision in Mr. Ve-
landia's deportation case "represented a significant shift in policy and
could open the door to the cancellation of deportations for other im-
migrants in same-sex marriages. ' 122 However, courts are still left to
resolve the issue of DOMA's constitutionality until and unless Con-
gress repeals it.123
3. Problematic Implications Regardless of the Supreme Court's
DOMA Decision
In December 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Wind-
sor v. United States, in which two women challenged DOMA's consti-
tutionality. 124 The case was scheduled for oral arguments in March
2013 with a decision expected in June. 125 Regardless of whether the
Court holds DOMA constitutional, the decision will have a significant
impact on aliens seeking residency who are legally married to U.S.
citizens under state law.
First, if the Supreme Court holds that DOMA is constitutional, this
entire conversation will be moot-Attorney General Holder's direc-
tives to the DOJ will be rendered meaningless. The DOJ, as an
agency of the executive branch, is not in a position to question the
authority and decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court has the ultimate power to determine the constitutionality of any
law enacted by Congress. As such, if the Supreme Court rules that the
DOMA is constitutional, the DOJ's position on the matter will have
no legal significance. Federal judges must abide by DOMA's provi-
sions and continue with scheduled deportation proceedings.
On the other hand, in the event that the Supreme Court holds
DOMA unconstitutional, Congress will still have to take affirmative
120. See In re Dorman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 485 (2011); see also Chris Geidner, Henry Velandia's
Deportation Proceeding Adjourned, AG Holder's Decision Cited as Reason, METRO WEEKLY
(May 6, 2011, 2:17 PM), http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2011/05/henry-velandias-deporta
tion-pr.html.
121. See In re Dorman, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 485; see also Boehner Letter, supra note 109.
122. Semple, supra note 5.
123. Id.
124. See Jonathan Capehart, The Supreme Court Takes Up DOMA, WASH. POST (Dec. 10,
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2012/12/07/the-supreme-court-
takes-up-doma; see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012); Windsor v. United
States, 797 F. Supp. 2d 320, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
125. Capehart, supra note 124.
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steps to grant these individuals residency rights in the United States.
DOMA simply represents an obstacle to the legal recognition of
same-sex marriages at the federal level; its invalidation would not au-
tomatically grant immigration rights to noncitizen spouses in same-sex
relationships. Instead, this decision would simply remove this hurdle.
Moreover, the impact of the Court's decision to invalidate DOMA
would depend on the level of scrutiny used to do so. Commentators
have argued that if the Supreme Court invalidates DOMA based on
the heightened scrutiny argument postulated by the DOJ, then "it is
likely that couples within all fifty states would be able to invoke that
ruling to secure the freedom to marry."'1 26 On the other hand, if the
Supreme Court were to rule that DOMA is unconstitutional based
upon the lesser standard of rational basis, "the impact, though signifi-
cant, would most certainly be far less dramatic (at least in the immedi-
ate term) than a ruling requiring heightened scrutiny."'1 27 This is
because some barriers would remain if rational basis is used, but
heightened scrutiny would likely clear the way entirely for homosexu-
als in the United States. 2 8
The implications of the Supreme Court's decision are clear. On one
hand, a finding that DOMA is constitutional, would foreclose immi-
gration status to same-sex spouses, at least for now. On the other
hand, if it decides that DOMA is unconstitutional, immigration law
still does not grant rights to these individuals. Federal judges may still
have to authorize deportations if immigration law is not changed to
protect foreign aliens in same-sex marriages to U.S. citizens. Thus, the
Supreme Court's invalidation of DOMA would be progressive, but
would not conclude the issue: Congress must still take affirmative
steps to provide immigrant status to those same-sex couples currently
in limbo.
B. Congress May Still Need to Explicitly Grant Same-Sex
Immigration Benefits Even if DOMA
Is Deemed Unconstitutional
The final concern regarding the delayed deportation proceedings is
that Congress still holds its plenary power in the realm of immigration
law. Thus, Congress's decision to admit or exclude aliens based on
126. Joseph Landau, DOMA and Presidential Discretion: Interpreting and Enforcing Federal
Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 619, 623 (2012).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 623-24.
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sexual orientation, or its choice to not recognize same-sex marriages,
cannot be questioned by the courts.129
This authority was clearly demonstrated in Chae Chan Ping v.
United States. Doctrinally, the case granted broad deference to Con-
gress in immigration matters. Factually, however, and far more per-
sonally, the case allowed Congress to enact a law that specifically
excluded Chinese individuals based solely on their race. 130 This is es-
pecially significant because racial discrimination is the most suspect
classification and subject to the highest degree of judicial scrutiny
when reviewed by the courts.131 However, the Chae Chan Ping Court
upheld the law (although it was later repealed in 1943).132 Unlike ra-
cial discrimination, as Attorney General Holder's letter made clear,
sexual orientation has not been made a "suspect class," and therefore,
does not undergo the same scrutiny when used as a basis for discrimi-
nation. 133 As such, it is even more important for Congress to extend
rights and protections to LGBT individuals in same-sex marriages be-
cause if the courts are not able or willing to prevent racial discrimina-
tion in immigration law, they will almost certainly be less willing to
prevent discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Another recent illustration of Congress's exclusionary power im-
pacting people entering the United States is when Congress excluded
HIV-positive individuals. 134 To be considered for admittance, U.S.
immigration procedure requires all noncitizens to be medically ex-
amined, part of which includes HIV testing.135 The law in question
disallowed individuals who were HIV-positive from being admitted
into the United States without being issued a waiver.1 36 Furthermore,
this exclusion did not classify these people based on any threat they
posed to the public health of the country; it was simply a blanket rule
that encompassed all individuals who had contracted HIV.1 37 This ex-
ample reinforces the notion that Congress has the power to exclude
anyone from the country, regardless of its reasoning and rationale,
and such power is not subject to judicial review or question.
The question then remains the same: how long will same-sex
couples have to wait in order to gain the protections necessary for
129. Mosten, supra note 4, at 384.
130. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
131. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (2006).
133. See Holder Letter, supra note 1, at 1-2.
134. See Zounes, supra note 25, at 531.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 532.
137. Id.
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them to be guaranteed a secure life in the United States? Even if
DOMA is successfully repealed, either through the courts or Con-
gress, in terms of immigration, these individuals must still seek rights
and protections under the law. This places them in a continued state
of uncertainty because not only may they have to wait for DOMA to
be repealed, they must also wait for Congress to explicitly grant them
immigration status in the United States. Although the DOJ's refusal
to defend DOMA may have a significant political and social policy
effect, it does nothing to alleviate the waiting period for noncitizens in
same-sex marriages seeking resident status in the United States.
IV. IMPACT
Taken as a whole, the DOJ's decision to stop defending DOMA will
adversely impact individuals who are similarly situated to Mr. Ve-
landia. Although refusing to defend what the executive branch has
deemed to be an unconstitutional statute seems relatively straightfor-
ward, the DOJ has essentially placed individuals in a state of confu-
sion regarding their legal status. Further, the decision has created a
situation that might cause inconsistent decisions from different immi-
gration judges. It has also led to uncertainty regarding what the law
actually is, which can cause people in these situations to make poor
decisions regarding their immigration status. Finally, the DOJ has
created tension between the branches of government.
Although the DOJ's decision to stop defending DOMA is a positive
and significant step toward attaining equal rights for individuals in
same-sex marriages, it is not nearly as significant considering how
much depends on the judiciary's decision regarding DOMA's consti-
tutionality. 138 Instead, it merely adds uncertainty to the residency sta-
tus of noncitizens in same-sex marriages. Ultimately, these individuals
must hope that the Supreme Court finds DOMA unconstitutional and
that Congress takes further action. If the Supreme Court holds that
DOMA is constitutional, individuals living in these same-sex mar-
riages will revert back to where they were prior to the DOJ's determi-
nation that DOMA is not constitutional. In addition, immigration law
judges will have no choice but to continue to find same-sex marriages
invalid for residency purposes, and deportations of these individuals
would resume. Therefore, federal judges currently staying deporta-
138. Semple, supra note 5.
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tion proceedings have simply placed these individuals in a state of
uncertainty. 139
In addition to the issues facing same-sex spouses in delayed depor-
tation proceedings, the DOJ's decision provides courts no guidance on
how to manage individual cases, which could lead to inconsistent re-
sults. There are over one hundred immigration judges throughout the
United States, and because the DOJ's directive is not legal precedent,
each judge has the discretion to decide whether or not to affirmatively
act in favor of individuals in same-sex marriages. 140 For example, Fre-
deric Deloizy, a French national married to an American citizen,
Mark Himes, is currently facing deportation before an immigration
judge. 141 Mr. Deloizy, hoping that his proceeding will be suspended,
is living in a state of limbo because he does not know how his judge
will react to the DOJ's decision. 142 Deloizy's spouse, Himes, ex-
plained the impact: "You live constantly with the stress of knowing
that you're a second-class citizen and at any moment your family
could be torn apart by the same government that permitted you to
become a family. 1 43 Thus, the discretion given to immigration judges
to suspend deportation proceedings in response to the DOJ's decision
not only contributes to the current state of limbo for these same-sex
couples, it may also lead to inconsistent results for cases that should
be decided uniformly.
A third effect that the DOJ's decision has on individuals is the pos-
sibility that it may create confusion, which could lead to poor decision
making by noncitizens in same-sex marriages. As discussed earlier,
there are several ways for a noncitizen to obtain residency status in
the United States.144 Regardless of the category under which a nonci-
tizen is admitted, he must meet certain requirements. 45 For immigra-
tion purposes, the system currently allows for four categories of
immigrants: "(1) family-sponsored immigrants; (2) employment-based
immigrants; (3) diversity immigrants; and (4) refugees."'1 46 A nonci-
tizen may also be admitted to the United States by qualifying as an
"immediate relative," which includes the spouse of a United States
139. See id.; see also Sarah Hoye, Man Faces Deportation Despite Marriage to U.S. Citizen,
CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/11/us/philadelphia-gay-couple-deportation/index.htm?iref=
obnetwork (last updated Jan. 12, 2012, 9:01 AM).
140. EOIR Immigration Court Listing, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/sibpages/ICadr.htm (last updated Mar. 1, 2013).
141. Hoye, supra note 139.
142. Id.
143. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 27, at 296.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 297.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
citizen. 147 More than one-third of noncitizens who gain immigrant
status in the United States do so through this latter category.
148
The problem, and greater concern, is that noncitizens in these situa-
tions may think that the DOJ's decision grants them residency status
and ultimately protects them from deportation. This false assumption
may lead them to make poor decisions regarding their immigration
options. With the complexities of immigration law come many differ-
ent alternatives to gaining protections under its provisions. Thus, it is
critical to understand that the DOJ decision does not grant a special
status or classification for gaining residency status. Same-sex couples
in this situation need to continue to explore other viable immigration
options. A failure to do so may result in a missed opportunity to qual-
ify for residency status through an alternative method, ultimately risk-
ing deportation. It would be tragic if these individuals had other
options, but ceased looking into these options in light of the DOJ
decision.
The final significant impact of the DOJ's decision is the way in
which it implicates deeply rooted principles of federalism. The U.S.
Constitution charges the Executive Branch with enforcing and de-
fending the laws of the United States.149 Further, the power to make
laws has always been vested in the Congress,' 50 and the power to adju-
dicate laws of Congress rests with the Supreme Court and its inferior
federal courts. 15 1 Now, it is true that the lines have been blurred be-
tween the separate powers of the three branches since the inception of
the Constitution, but the DOJ, as an executive entity, does not hold
the legal power to declare a statute unconstitutional; this power is
vested solely in the judicial branch. 152 One commentator has even
been so bold as to state,
This was political spin. This is existing federal law. It is getting
tougher and tougher to defend in the current environment. But it is
the law of the land. I am certain the administration will keep fight-
ing the challenges to Obamacare. You don't get to pick and choose
which laws to defend. 153
147. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
148. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 27, at 327.
149. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
150. Id. art. I, § 1.
151. Id. art. III, § 1.
152. Id.
153. Fred Lucas, DOJ Shirking Duty in Not Defending DOMA, Critics Say, CNSNEWS.COM
(Feb. 23, 2011), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/doj-shirking-duty-not-defending-doma-critics-
say (quoting Jordan Sekulow, attorney and director of policy for the American Center for Law
and Justice).
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Ultimately, the problem affects the relationship between the
branches of the federal government. Although the Obama adminis-
tration claimed to have "had no choice," it had a choice: enforce the
laws of the United States, as is its duty, or completely disregard
them. 154 To some, this move may seem to advance the rights of a "po-
litically powerless" minority.155 However, one could also advance the
argument that although this may be a step toward equality for minori-
ties in a social and political context, it also can be viewed as the execu-
tive branch continuing down a path of ignoring its duties under the
Constitution and disregarding the rights and powers of the judiciary
and Congress.
V. CONCLUSION
The DOJ, at the direction of President Obama, made the bold deci-
sion to halt its defense of DOMA in the courts. This is unquestiona-
bly a positive step in attaining equal rights for a historically
disadvantaged group. However, although it may be categorized by
some as a huge step in obtaining rights for a minority group of individ-
uals, the decision is not without its criticisms and pitfalls. Unfortu-
nately, the decision ultimately has a limited legal impact on
individuals living in the United States.
Noncitizens in valid, same-sex marriages under state law are placed
in a state of limbo in which one lives "constantly with the stress of
knowing that you're a second-class citizen and at any moment your
family could be torn apart by the same government that permitted you
to become a family."'1 56 Life is already complicated for these individu-
als because they are constantly faced with the prospect of deportation,
but the situation is even further complicated because some individuals
are being given a pseudo legal status by judges who are willing to stay
deportations as a result of the decision. 157 This decision has also cre-
ated the potential for misunderstanding, which can ultimately cause
individuals to make poor decisions that leave them in a worse situa-
tion than before. Although the decision may be revered by many as




155. See Holder Letter, supra note 1, at 2-3.
156. See Hoye, supra note 139.
157. See Semple, supra note 5.
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